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I. COMMUNICATIONS LAW
Extending The Common-Law Official Report Privilege To
Foreign Governments: Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A-Ilbo
The evolution of defamation law reflects the tension between society's
competing interests in encouraging the free flow of information about
matters of public concern and protecting an individual's reputation from
injury.' The common law attempted to reconcile the competing interests by
creating a general rule that a defendant publishes defamatory statements at
his peril unless the defendant can prove that the statement is true or the
defendant made the statement on a privileged occasion. 2 The common-law
1. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 135-36, 516 A.2d
220, 225 0986) (discussing evolution of common law of defamation). Historically, the common
law regarded as so socially significant an individual's interest in the enjoyment and maintenance
of a good reputation that English and American courts imposed strict liability on persons who
published defamatory statements. See W.P. KEEToN, D. DOBBS, R. KETON, & D. OwEN,
PROSSER & KE TON ON ToRTs § 113, at 804 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing early history of state
defamation law) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In direct contrast to courts' interest in
protecting reputation, English and American courts also have recognized that, for a free society
to function effectively, the public must have access to all relevant information about all types
of government activity. See id. (discussing history of defamation law); see also Dairy Stores,
104 N.J. at 136, 516 A.2d at 225 (noting courts' increasing awareness of need for public
information on wide variety of issues); Comment, Constitutional Privilege to Republish
Defamation, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 1266, 1266-1267 (1977) (discussing competing values of
reputation and public's right to information about government) [hereinafter Comment]. The.
interests of protecting an individual's reputation and safeguarding the free flow of information
are incompatible to the extent that the protection of private reputation by the imposition of
liability deters the press from reporting important information to the public. See Note, Privilege
to Republish Defamation, 64 CoLUM. L. Rv. 1102, 1102 (1964) (discussing tension between
reputation and freedom of the press) [hereinafter Note].
2. PROSSER & KE TON, supra note 1, § 113, at 804. Traditionally, the common law has
accommodated the public need for certain information by recognizing that some otherwise
defamatory statements should be privileged. See Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. at 136, 516 A.2d at
225 (discussing the common law republication privilege). A "privileged" defamatory statement
does not create liability for the publisher. Id. An absolute privilege provides to publishers of
certain statements complete immunity from liability. Id. The common law has granted an
absolute privilege to statements made in judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings
because unfettered expression is crucial to the public welfare. See id. (discussing common-law
defamation privileges); Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 558, 117
A.2d 889, 892-94 (1955) (discussing rationale behind common-law absolute privilege); Story v.
Norfolk-Portsmouth Newspapers, Inc., 202 Va. 588, 590, 118 S.E.2d 668, 669-70 (1961)
(distinguishing between absolute and qualified privilege in defamation law). Other statements,
such as those made outside government proceedings but for the public welfare, enjoy a
qualified or conditional privilege. Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 333-34, 153 A.2d
36, 43-44 (1959) (recognizing qualified privilege to report statements made in public municipal
council "conference room" meeting). See Dijkstra v. Westerink, 168 N.J. Super. 128, 134-36,
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rule of republication liability and the official report privilege exception to
the republication rule reflect a delicate balance between protecting individual
reputation and the media's reporting about events of a public concern.'
Under the republication rule, a person who republishes a libelous statement
is subject to the same liability as the person who originally made the
statement. 4 The official report privilege permits a person to republish without
liability accounts of public proceedings or official government reports even
if portions of the account or report are defamatory.5 In Chang-Sin Lee v.
401 A.2d 1118, 1120-22 (granting qualified privilege to statements made to authorities for
prevention and detection of crime), cert. denied, 81 N.J. 329, 467 A.2d 1203 (1979). To rely
on the qualified privilege, a publisher must provide a fair-and substantially true account of
the particular government proceeding or report. See Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F.
Supp. 1005, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1979) (stating that privileged newspaper report must be impartial
and accurate account of event as recorded in public record); Alexandria Gazette Corp. v.
West, 198 Va. 154, 159-60, 93 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1956) (discussing qualified privilege); infra
note 53 (discussing attribution requirement). A libel plaintiff may overcome a qualified privilege
and impose liability on the publisher if the plaintiff proves that the defendant published the
defamatory statement with malice. See Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. at 136, 516 A.2d at 225
(discussing generally common-law qualified privilege). The plaintiff must prove common-law
malice to overcome a qualified privilege. See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 15, 325 S.E.2d
713, 727 (1985) (discussing burden of proof when defendant invokes official report privilege).
Common-law malice is behavior that involves an intent or motive arising from personal spite
or ill-will. See id. (defining common-law malice). The qualified privilege has emerged as one
of the prime mechanisms for balancing the interest in reputation and the interest in the
publication of information of public concern. See Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. at 137, 516 A.2d at
226 (discussing contexts in which courts have applied qualified privilege).
3. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1267-69 (discussing development of republication rule
and official report privilege).
4. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir.) (stating that person who
repeats defamatory statement is as liable as original defamer), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836
(1981); Dixson v. Newsweek, 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (stating that republication of
false, defamatory statement is a tort as much as publication of original statement); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) (defining republication rule). A person who republishes a
libel is subject to liability even if he attributes the libelous statement to the original publisher
or expressly disavows the truth of the statement. See Medico, 643 F.2d at 137 n.5 (discussing
common-law rule of republication); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLADER AND RELATED PROBLEMs 86-87
(1980) (discussing general principles of republication rule). The concern underlying the repub-
lication rule is simple: each time a publisher reprints a libelous matter the target of the report
suffers another serious injury. RESTATaMENT (SacoND) OF TORTS § 578, comment b (1977).
5. Medico, 643 F.2d at 137; Alexandria Gazette, 198 Va. at 159-60, 93 S.E.2d at 279;
see also R. SACK, supra note 4, at 316 (discussing official report privilege). The official report
privilege is a limited exception to the republication rule. R. SACK, supra note 4, at 316. Courts
also have called the official report privilege the fair report privilege, the record privilege, the
reporter's privilege, or the public eye doctrine. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
the official report privilege as:
[t]he publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an
official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a
matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a
fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977).
Courts have applied the official report privilege to various official actions and proceed-
ings of the United States government and its subdivisions. See, e.g., Medico, 643 F.2d at 137-
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Dong-A-Ibo6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
addressed for the first time whether to extend the official report privilege
to reports of official actions of foreign governments.
7
In Chang-Sin Lee two South Korean intelligence agencies, the National
Security Planning Agency and the Military Security Command, issued a
press release announcing the disruption of two North Korean espionage
rings operating in the United States and West Germany.8 Six Virginia
newspapers, including the Dong-A-Ilbo, and one Virginia public television
station reported the announcement, relying on accounts that had appeared
in the South Korean press.9 The reports identified Chang-Sin Lee, a South
Korean citizen living in New York, as a North Korean spy. 10 In response
43 (applying privilege to report containing United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
documents); Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell Co., 228 F.2d 797, 802 (4th Cir. 1956) (concerning
report of comment by presidential candidate on dismissal of high party official); Mathis v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406, 416 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (concerning republication
of police suspect's photograph); Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357,
-, 149 A.2d 193, 206-07 (1959) (concerning report of testimony at secret Senate subcom-
mittee meeting); Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, -, 187 A.2d 586, 592 (1963) (concerning
study commissioned by governor of New York on activities of organized crime figures);
Alexandria Gazette, 198 Va. at 163-64, 93 S.E.2d at 281-82 (concerning report of judicial
proceedings). Newspapers, broadcasting stations, and other persons in the business of reporting
news to the public commonly exercise the official report privilege. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 611, comment c (1977).
6. 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, (Oct. 14, 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57
U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1989) (No. 88-1145).
7. Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1988). The Chang-
Sin Lee decision marked the first time that a United States court considered whether the
official report privilege extends to reports about official actions of foreign governments. Id.
at 878.
8. Id. at 877. In Chang-Sin Lee a South Korean intelligence agency press release
announced that the South Korean government had arrested 22 persons on charges of spying
for North Korea. Brief for Appellee at 4, Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578). The press release also provided details about other North Korean
agents who allegedly wre operating a student-run espionage network at Western Illinois
University. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. The description of the espionage network was a
major news story in South Korea, extensively reported by all of the major newspapers and
broadcast on the state-sponsored television station, the Korean Broadcasting System. Record
at 6, Chang-Sin Lee (No. 87-2578).
9. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. In Chang-Sin Lee some of the defendant newspapers
simply reprinted the story about the Korean espionage ring as the story appeared in Korea.
Id. The Virginia television station aired a rebroadcast from the Korean Broadcasting System.
Id. With the exception of one newspaper, all of the stories were in Korean, targeted for the
Korean-American community. Id.
10. Id. The plaintiff, Chang-Sin Lee, emigrated to the United States from the Republic
of Korea with members of his family in October 1975. Brief for Appellant at 3, Chang-Sin
Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578). Chang-Sin Lee graduated
from Western Illinois University in 1984 with a Bachelor of Arts degree. Id. The United States
government had admitted Chang-Sin Lee as a permanent resident alien to the United States.
Id. At the time of the alleged libel, the plaintiff was studying television production full-time
in New York City. Id. The South Korean courts subsequently convicted in absentia on charges
of espionage the individual allegedly misidentified in the press release and media accounts as
Chang-Sin Lee. Id. at 5 n.2.
1989]
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to the reports, Chang-Sin Lee filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia a libel action against the newspapers and
the public television station alleging that the news reports damaged Chang-
Sin Lee's reputation." Extending the official report privilege to the repub-
lication of all government reports, foreign and domestic, the district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 12 Chang-Sin Lee
appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.
13
Reviewing the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment and held that the official report
privilege does not apply to reports based on a South Korean government
press release.' 4 The Fourth Circuit first noted that while the Supreme Court
has not explicitly recognized the official report privilege as a constitutional
privilege, the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of first amendment
considerations in press reports of official government proceedings." The
11. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. Although the plaintiff in Chang-Sin Lee lived in
New York and first learned of the spy story from New York newspapers, he filed suit in
Virginia because Virginia has one of the fastest legal processes in the country. Brief for
Appellee at 10, Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578).
12. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. To overcome the official report privilege, the
plaintiff in Chang-Sin Lee had to show that the defendants published the reports with common-
law malice. Id.; see supra note 2 (defining common-law malice). The plaintiff in Chang-Sin
Lee did not prove common-law malice to overcome the official report privilege and, therefore,
the district court granted the media defendants' motion for summary judgment. Chang-Sin
Lee, 849 F.2d at 877.
13. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877.
14. Id. at 880. In Chang-Sin Lee the Fourth Circuit applied Virginia law because the
alleged libel occurred in Virginia. Id. at 877.
15. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. Id.; see Landmark Communications Y. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 837-46 (1978) (striking down as unconstitutional portion of Virginia statute
imposing criminal sanctions for reporting confidential proceedings of judicial review commis-
sion); Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (granting summary judgment
for media defendant in invasion of privacy action for publication of public record that named
a deceased rape victim). In Cox Broadcasting the Supreme Court seemingly gave constitutional
stature to a limited version of the official report privilege. See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at
491-97 (discussing importance to public of information concerning court proceedings); Hill,
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 CoLum. L. Rv. 1205, 1219-20
(arguing that first amendment mandates official report privilege) (1977); Comment, supra note
1, at 1269-70 (discussing constitutional protection accorded to official report privilege). In Cox
Broadcasting a television station accurately reported the name of a rape victim that the station
had obtained from public court records. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 473-74. The Supreme
Court held that in a privacy suit a state may not impose sanctions on an accurate report that
the broadcaster based on public records. Id. at 491. Furthermore, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone
the Court indicated in dictum that the rule of Cox Broadcasting applies to defamation suits
because the Cox Broadcasting decision protects the public interest in receiving accurate reports
of judicial proceedings. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976). Arguably, the first
amendment protects from defamation liability the accurate republication of material contained
in public court records. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 457 (granting constitutional stature to
limited version of official report privilege); Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 495-97 (applying
record privilege in invasion of privacy action); Comment, supra note 1, at 1270 (discussing
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Fourth Circuit discussed next the three policy rationales that support the
official report privilege: the agency rationale, the public supervision ration-
ale, an d the informational rationale.
16 According to the agency rationale, a
person who republishes government reports that are available to the public
acts as an agent for persons that could inform themselves about the content
of government reports. 17 The public supervision rationale recognizes that
the public's review of official government actions keeps the government
acpountable to the pepple. s The informational rationale focuses on the
public's right to know about newsworthy events.' 9 The Fourth Circuit
first amendment considerations underlying common-law defamation privileges). The Supreme
Court in Firestone, however, issued a cautionary note by stating that the details of most
courtroom proceedings would add almost nothing toward advancing the uninhibited debate on
public issues, Firestone, 424 U.S. at 457. But see Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d
143, 120 (2d Cir.) (creating constitutional privilege of neutral reportage to cover publication
of newsworthy events), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1P77); infra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text (discussing Edwards).
16. Chang-Sin Lee, 819 F.2d at 878-79. The policy rationales that justify the official
report privilege are importaht in Chang-Sin Lee because of the lack of case law addressing
whether the privilege applies to acts of foreign governments. Id. at 878. However, despite
recognizing a privilege of the press to republish defamation uttered in certain contexts, courts
4aye failed to state adequately the rationale for deciding whether to invoke the official report
privilege in a particular case. See Note, supra note 1, at 1102 (discussing possible theoretical
justifications for official report privilege).
17. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 878; see also Fairbanks Publishing Co. y. Francisco,
390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alaska 1964) (basing fair report privilege on -assumption that member of
public could inquire and learn about government proceedings if proceedings or reports of
proceedings are available to public). The agency rAtionale for the official report privilege rests
on thp assumption that one who reports what happens in a public, official proceeding acts as
an agent for persons who had a right to attend the proceeding. See Medico v. Time, Inc.,
643 F.2d 134, lI0-41 (3d Cir.) (explaining agency rationale for official report privilege), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981). The agent informs the public of what it might have seen for
itself. See Note, supra note 1, at 1116 (discussing agency rationale). The agency rationale,
however, cannot explair application of the official report privilege to proceedings or reports
not open to the publi See Medico, 643 F.2d at 141 (explaining policy rationales underlying
official report privilege;.
18. Chang Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 878. The public supervision rationale for the official
report privilege rests on the assumption that public review of official actions is beneficial to
the democratic pontrol of institutions that are responsible for carrying out the public will. See
Note, supra note 1, at 1103-11 (discussing public supervision rationale). The right of a citizen
to supervise government action is paramount in a democracy. Id. at 1106. The citizenry is the
final judge of the proper conduct of public business. Medico, 643 F.2d at 143. For example,
exposing the coptent of a government agency's records such as the Federal Bureau of
InvestigationTs records may help to ensure impartial enforcement of the laws. Id. at 141.
19. Chapg-Sin Lee, 849 F,2d at 878. Courts have cited most frequently the informational
rationale to justify the application of the official report privilege. See R. SACK, supra note 4,
at 316-17 (discussing significance of informational rationale). The general social and political
interest in permitting citizens to learn about the operations of government without the courts
imposing a risk upon persons who report the information to the public persuasively supports
the official report privilege. Id. at 317. See generally D. ELDER, THE FAIR REPORT PR1VIEqE
3-4 (1988) (discussing policy rationales underlying official report privilege); Note, The Devel-
oping Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 VA. L. REv. 853, 856-58 (1983) (explaining various
rationales that support common law privileges of libel law); Note, supra note 1, at 1102-20
(discussing policy rationales that justify official report privilege).
19891
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explained that the informational rationale most directly applied to the facts
of Chang-Sin Lee because Americans, and Korean-Americans in particular,
have a strong interest in learning that South-Korea, an American ally, had
disrupted a spy ring that was operating in the United States. 20
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that the three policy rationales
for the official report privilege are important because of the lack of prior
case law extending the privilege to reports of foreign government activities,
the Fourth Circuit in Chang-Sin Lee declined to extend the privilege to the
Korean government reports for three primary reasons. 21 First, the Fourth
Circuit stated that the three policy rationales were not persuasive in the
context of foreign government activities.? The Fourth Circuit explained that
the agency rationale was not applicable to the reports of Korean government
activities. 23 The Fourth Circuit determined that the media defendants were
not acting as agents for those who could inform themselves because the
media defendants, readers, and viewers did not have access to information
available only in Korea. 24 The Fourth Circuit also explained that the public
supervision rationale did not apply to the South Korean government press
release because the American public could not influence directly the South
Korean government. 2 Finally, in explaining why the rationales were not
persuasive in the foreign government context, the Fourth Circuit discounted
the importance of the informational rationale. 26 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that while the agency and public supervision rationales are less important
when reports involve foreign governments, the informational rationale ap-
plies to all matters of public importance whether the press receives the
information from a foreign government report or a private individual. 27 The
Chang-Sin Lee majority, however, failed to discuss further the reasons for
20. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 878-79. The Fourth Circuit in Chang-Sin Lee stated that
an espionage ring operating in the United States clearly is a legitimate matter of public concern.
Id. at 879.
21. Id.
22. Id. The Chang-Sin Lee majority did not explain in detail why the policy rationales
for the official report privilege are not persuasive in the foreign government context nor did
the majority cite any authority to support the conclusion that the rationales do not apply in
the foreign government context. See supra note 16 (discussing courts' general failure to address
adequately policy rationale in deciding whether to apply official report privilege in particular
case).




27. Id. The majority in Chang-Sin Lee seemed to suggest that a court can justify in
almost any case the official report privilege by using the informational rational. See id. (stating
reasons for not extending official report privilege to Korean government press release).
Therefore, the Chang-Sin Lee majority reasoned that a court should take into account other
factors to determine whether a court should extend the privilege to acts of foreign governments.
See id. (discussing why informational rationale supporting official report privilege is not
persuasive in foreign government context).
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
finding that the informational rationale does not support the extension of
the official report privilege to foreign government reports.28
Second, the Fourth Circuit in declining to extend the official report
privilege to the Korean reports determined that providing a blanket privilege
to the media for reports of foreign government activities might cause
incidental defamation to private individuals. 9 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that, when the news media receives official reports from foreign govern-
ments, the information in the reports may contain inaccuracies that could
cause defamation because information from foreign governments is not
necessarily more reliable than information that the media receives from
nonofficial domestic sources. 0 Thus, the Fourth Circuit was reluctant to
extend the official report privilege to the Korean government reports."
Third, the Fourth Circuit declined to extend the official report privilege
because Virginia libel law, which places on the plaintiff the difficult burden
of proving falsity and negligence, already affords media defendants sufficient
protection.3 2 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that extending a
blanket official report privilege in Chang-Sin Lee was unnecessary.3
After declining to extend a blanket privilege to the reports of foreign
government activities, the Fourth Circuit addressed a case-by-case approach
that the dissent proposed.34 Under the dissent's case-by-case approach, a
court, in deciding whether to extend the official report privilege to reports
of foreign government activities, would make a case-by-case determination
based on the public importance of the information and the reliability of
the report.35 The Fourth Circuit majority found that the dissent's approach
28. See id. (explaining inapplicability in foreign government context of policy rationales
that support official report privilege),
29. Id. at 880.
30. Id. at 879. According to the Fourth Circuit in Chang-Sin Lee, the underlying reason
in the United States for the official report privilege is the relationship between the American
people and the government. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that Americans consider their
government to be open and reliable. Id. The Fourth Circuit also noted that reports of
government acts, proceedings, and investigations keep the government accountable for its
actions. Id. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit noted that the American people are not
very familiar with foreign government operations, and many foreign governments are not as
reliable and open as the United States government. Id. For example, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that some countries may take advantage of the liberal press rights in America by
maliciously defaming private individuals. Id. at 880. Furthermore, the Chang-Sin Lee majority
found that the American people cannot hold foreign governments accountable for a foreign
government's malicious actions. Id. at 879.
31, Id. at 880.
32. Id. at 879. In a libel action, the plaintiff bears a considerable burden to prove
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence and falsity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. Moreover, the libel plaintiff also must prove malice by clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the official report privilege. See Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va.
142, 151-52, 334 S.E.2d 846, 852-53 (1985) (discussing plaintiff's burden of proving malice
under Virginia libel law); supra note 2 (defining malice).
33. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 879.
34. Id. at 879-80.
35. Id. at 879.
19891
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would present a number of problems.3 6 The majority first reasoned that
courts would have difficulty establishing criteria for determining case-by-
case which governments exhibit the reliability and accountability that are
necessary to justify extending the privilege.17 The majority explained that
reasonable persons could differ in objectively applying the criteria. 8 Second,
the majority disagreed with the dissent's emphasis on the public's right to
information about foreign government activity even if some of the infor-
mation in a foreign government report is defamatory.39 The majority em-
phasized that the protection against injury to individual reputation remains
a strong state interest that courts must balance against the first amendment
interest in reporting matters of public concern.4 The Fourth Circuit further
explained that the dissent's approach might result in a blanket application
of the privilege, thus affording virtually no protection to individuals that
foreign government reports defame. 41 Third, the majority explained that
proper attribution of the source of a report would not prevent false or
undeserved reliance by the reader on a foreign government's report.42 The
majority was unwilling to impute to most Americans sufficient knowledge
about foreign governments to determine from attribution whether a report
from a foreign government agency is reliable. 43 The majority reasoned that
because Americans lack knowledge about foreign governments, the average
reader would believe that the official reports of an unreliable foreign
government were trustworthy even if proper attribution were present in the
news report. 44 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the press must verify
36. Id. at 879-80.
37. Id. at 879.
38. Id. But see infra notes 73-80, 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing merits of
dissent's case-by-case approach).
39. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 879. The United States Supreme Court has held that a
newspaper or broadcaster who publishes defamatory material may not claim constitutional
protection from liability because the defamatory statement concerned a matter of public
concern. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (balancing public importance
of information and individual reputation in public figure case). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit
in Chang-Sin Lee stated that, because a defamatory expression concerns a matter of public
interest, the public's right to know about the information alone should not entitle the defendant
to shield himself from liability by using the common law official report privilege. Chang-Sin
Lee, 849 F.2d at 879.
40. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 879; see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (balancing individual reputation against first amendment interest in
free press).
41. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 879-80. Because the reports of foreign governments
always will be important to a certain individual or group in a diverse society, the Fourth
Circuit in Chang-Sin Lee believed that courts automatically would characterize all foreign
government reports as matters of public importance. Id. at 880. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
feared that foreign government reports always would fall under the official report privilege.
Id.
42. Id. at 880; see infra note 53 (discussing significance of proper attribution).
43. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 880.
44. Id. Before extending the official report privilege to acts of foreign governments, the
dissent in Chang-Sin Lee would have remanded the case to the district court to determine
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
foreign government reports in the same manner that the press verifies
reports from private sources. 45 The Fourth Circuit in Chang-Sin Lee con-
cluded that the potential harm to the reputation of private citizens out-
weighed the burden on the press to verify foreign government reports.
46
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the media defendants by declining to extend the official
report privilege to the Korean government reports. 47
While agreeing with the majority that a blanket privilege for reports of
foreign government activities would be unwise, the Chang-Sin Lee dissent
stated that a qualified privilege extended on a case-by-case basis would
provide to courts a more appropriate mechanism for balancing the interests
of personal reputation and the public's right to know about foreign gov-
ernment activities. 4 The dissent first argued that, when a court considers
whether to apply the official report privilege in a given context, the court
may give greater weight to one of the three rationales supporting the
privilege.49 In Chang-Sin Lee the dissent, like the majority, noted that the
agency and public supervision rationales are less important than the infor-
mational rationale in cases involving reports of foreign government activi-
ties. 0 The dissent, instead, focused on the public's right to know about
whether each of the media defendants properly attributed the reports. Id. at 880 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting); see infra note 53 (discussing importance of attribution requirement to official
report privilege).
45. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 880. The majority believed that information from a
foreign government is not any more reliable than information from private sources. Id.
46. Id. The Chang-Sin Lee majority's language suggests that the majority may have
feared that extending the official report privilege to the foreign government context would
discourage the press from properly verifying the accuracy of foreign government reports. See
id. (stating that potential harm to one's reputation outweighs burden on press to confirm
sources of information in foreign government reports). The Fourth Circuit in Chang-Sin Lee,
however, also acknowledged that the decision not to extend the official report privilege to the
foreign government context could cause some newspapers and television stations to reduce
their reporting of foreign government activities. Id.; see infra notes 95-100 (discussing chilling
effect on press of majority's decision).
47. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 880.
48. Id. at 880 (Kaufman, J., dissenting); see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text
(discussing common-law privileges).
49. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881 (Kaufman, J., dissenting); see also Medico v. Time,
Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir.) (stating that informational rationale for official report
privilege was most applicable to article that focused on organized crime), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 836 (1981).
50. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). The dissent in Chang-
Sin Lee did not deny the importance of the public supervision rationale in certain contexts.
Id. The dissent noted that, while citizens of one state cannot directly supervise governmental
activities of another state, courts, nevertheless, have extended the official report privilege to
government reports issued by one state and republished by another state. Id. Courts wisely
have recognized the arbitrariness of any attempt to restrict geographically, by declining to
apply the privilege to publications occurring in other parts of the national jurisdiction, the
sphere of applicability of the common-law fair report privilege. See Btown v. Globe Printing
Co., 213 Mo. 611, -, 112 S.W. 462, 467-68 (1968) (stating that court correctly applied
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foreign government activities."
Stressing the importance of the informational rationale, the dissent
suggested that courts could assess on a case-by-case basis whether to grant
a qualified privilege to reports of foreign government activities, 52 The dissent
reasoned that in determining whether to extend the privilege in a given case
courts should focus on the reliability of the foreign government and, more
significantly, on the importance of the publication to a particular audience. 3
official report privilege to Missouri account of New York gubernatorial proceeding); Webb v.
Times Publishing Co., 2 All E.R. 789, 800 (1960) (stating that English citizens have strong
interest in British judicial proceedings that occur in any British court). See generally D. ELDER,
supra note 19, at 135-36 (1988) (discussing extension of official report privilege to nonlocal
and foreign government proceedings). Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the
constitutional limits of free expression cannot vary from state to state. See Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966) (public figure case); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)
(free speech case).
The dissent in Chang-Sin Lee also questioned the relevance of the agency rationale in
instances when the government report is not available for public inspection because a person
cannot obtain for himself the government document. ChangSin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881; see
Medico, 643 F,2d 134, 140-41 & n.23 (discussing inapplicability of agency rationale in case
concerning republication of defamatory secret FBI report); supra note 17 and accompanying
text (explaining agency rationale). In Chang-Sin Lee the South Korean government press release
was available only in South Korea. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 878.
51. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881 (Kaufman, J., dissenting); see supra notes 19-20
and accompanying text (discussing informational rationale).
52. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 882 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 881. Although the Chang-Sin Lee dissent recognized problems courts might
encounter while assessing case-by-case the credibility of foreign government agencies, the
dissent stated that the public's interest in certain information about foreign government activity
outweighs the risks that courts could violate principles of international comity or that the
information would be unreliable. Id. at 881-82. The Chang-Sin Lee majority, however, argued
that the American people will assume that official reports of foreign governments are trust-
worthy. Id. at 880. The dissent, nevertheless, maintained that many Americans likely will
discredit a foreign government press release if the United States government perceives the
foreign government to be unreliable and, therefore, republishing foreign government reports
would not damage the reputations of private individuals. Id. at 882.
The Chang-Sin Lee dissent also stressed the importance of the attribution requirement
to a court's determination of whether to apply the qualified official report privilege in a
particular case. Id. at 884. If the source of the story is not apparent from specific attribution
or from the overall context of the article, the defendant cannot evoke the official report
privilege. See Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 739 (DC. Cir. 1985)
(explaining importance of proper attribution), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986). Thus, if an
author fails to indicate that an official government report was the source of the story, the
author has failed to meet the attribution requirement. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 885
(explaining attribution requirement) (Kaufman, J., dissenting); Dameron, 779 F.2d at 739
(discussing need for proper attribution); infra note 59 (discussing Dameron court's decision
not to extend official report privilege to article based on National Transportation Safety Board
report). According to the Chang-Sin Lee dissent, proper attribution will decrease the risk of
incidental defamation because attribution will enable the reader to evaluate the reliability of a
statement. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 885. The dissent found that proper attribution protects
individuals from incidental defamation and the news media from liability because attribution
ensures that the press will publish reliable stories, Id. In Chang-Sin Lee the dissent found
from the district court record that proper attribution was present only with respect to three
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The dissent also noted that the lack of case law concerning the application
of the official report privilege to reports of foreign government activities
indicates that media defendants would not assert the privilege frequently in
the foreign government context.54 Thus, the dissent concluded that deciding
case-by-case whether to extend the official report privilege to reports of
foreign governments would not overburden the judiciary.5
In addition to noting that courts seldom have considered whether to
extend the official report privilege to the foreign government context, the
dissent further noted that case-by-case analysis is common in libel law.16
For example, courts frequently have decided on a case-by-case basis whether
a particular plaintiff is a public figure for the purposes of libel law.5 7 In
Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc." the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia considered whether an air traffic controller
was a public figure. 9 In Dameron an air traffic controller sued Washington
Magazine, Inc. for libel following the publication of a Washingtonian
magazine article about a National Transportation Safety Board report that
blamed an air traffic controller for a particular airplane accident. 6° Consid-
of the seven media defendants' stories. Id. at 885-86. Proper attribution was a factual issue
which the district court did not address and which the dissent could not determine for all the
defendants from the record. Id. at 886; see also Dameron, 779 F.2d at 739 (stating that
attribution must be apparent from overall context of article). The dissent, therefore, would
have remanded the case to the district court to determine the question of attribution. Chang-
Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 886.
54. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see infra notes 57-80 and accompanying text (discussing case-by-case analysis in
libel law).
57. See Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 740-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(analyzing from facts of case whether plaintiff is public or private figure), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1141 (1986); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir.) (stating
that courts must look at facts of case to determine whether plaintiff in defamation suit is
public figure), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation:
New York Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 Rtrr.-CAm. L.J.
471, 487 (1985) (stating that determination of public figure entails case-by-case determination
of what constitutes public issue); see also infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing
manageability of case-by-case analysis in cases similar to Chang-Sin Lee).
58. 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
59. Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 740-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986). In addition to addressing the public figure issue, the District
of Columbia Circuit in Dameron considered whether the official report privilege applied to a
magazine article based on a National Transportation Safety Board report of an airline disaster.
Id. The district court found that the official report privilege shielded from liability the publisher
of the magazine article. Id. at 743. The District of Columbia Circuit, however, held that the
official report privilege did not apply because a reader of the magazine article would not
recognize that the article concerned a National Transportation Safety Board report. Id. at 740.
The Dameron court reasoned that, because the magazine article did not necessarily relate to
the National Transportation Safety Board report, the author left the reader with a conclusion
which the author may not have based on the National Transportation Safety Board report.
Id.; see supra note 53 (discussing attribution requirement of official report privilege).
60. Dameron, 779 F.2d at 738. The plaintiff in Dameron was the sole air traffic controller
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ering the particular facts of the case, the bameron court found that the air
traffic controller played a central role in a public controversy. 6' The Dam-
eron court, therefore, held that the plaintiff was an involuntary, limited-
purpose public figure.62 In reaching the decision, the Dameroh court noted
that the circumstances in which courts must determine on a case-by-case
basis whether a plaintiff is an involuntary, limited-purpose public figure
seldom will arise. 63 In Chang-Sin Lee the dissent advocated a similar cas6-
by-case approach because courts rarely hear cases in whicti defendants
attempt to extend the official report privilege to reports of foreign govern-
ment activities. 64 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that a court reasonably
could cbnsidet the particular facts of a case to determine whether the court
should extend the official report privilege to a particular relort of foreign
government activity.
65
To further support the case-by-case approach, the dissent in Chang-Sin
Lee discussed the English case Webb v. Times Publishing Co.66 IA Webb
the Court for the Queen's Bench consid6red whether Engligh hewipapbrg
were privileged to print details of a Swiss trial.67 In Webb Hhirhe, a British
citizen on trial for murder in the Swiss courts, admitted that he had killed
the father of his wife's child.6 Hume's wife, the plaintiff in the English
case, asserted that the publication of Hume's admissions was libelous
because the admissions imputed to her the crime of adultery.69 Balancing
the English public interest in the Swiss judicial ptocedding and the interest
in protecting Hume's reputation, the Webb court refused to extend a blanket
fair report privilege to foteigri gbvernm~nt proceedings.70 The court ex-
plained, however, that foreign government proceedings soletilmes will have
on duty at Dulles International Airport in VirginiA on the day a TWA plaht drashed intd Mt.
Weather in Virginia. Id. The Washingtonian magazide articld at issue ii Dameron disdusswl
various airplane adcidents and reported that the plhintiff partially was responsible fot the Mt.
Weather airplane acciderit. Id.
61. Id. at 741.
62. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the plaintiff in Dameron was
an involuntary public figure for the limited purpose of discssing the Mt. Weather airplane
accident. Id.
63. Id. at 743.
64. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881 (Kaufman, J., dissenting); .ee infra notes 13-104
and accompanying text (discussing merits of dissent's case-by-case approach td official report
privilege in foreign government context).
65. Id. at 882 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
66. 2 All E.R. 789 (1960).
61. Webb v. Times Publishing Co., 2 All E.R. 789, 794, (1960). Webb is the only case
that has extended the official report privilege to a foreign government proceeding. See D.
ELDER, supra note 19, at 138 n.12 (discussing Wbb holding).
68. Webb, 2 All E.R. at 791.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 800. Because of the court's concern for individual repdtatibn, the Web court
refused to extend a blanket privilege to foreign government reports because the Webb court
correctly recognized that official reports of foreign governments do not necessarily C6ntain as
high a degree of reliability as reports from domestic government agencies. Id.
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special connections with English affairs and will create for English readers
legitimate and proper interest in reports of the proceedings. 71 Accordingly,
the Webb court held that the common law requires a qualified official
report privilege to protect from liability the publishers of certain newspaper
articles concerning foreign government proceedings that are of public con-
cern to English readers.
72
Similarlyj the Fourth Circuit should have recognized the qualified priv-
ilege that the dissent proposed instead of holding that the official report
privilege never applies to reports of foreign governments. 73 In proposing the
qualified privilege, the dissent in Chang-Sin Lee correctly adopted the Webb
court's reasoning.74 The dissent, like the Webb court, recognized that a
court should consider the newsworthiness of an event and the audience for
which the news has interest when determining whether an article is of public
concern.7s In Chang-Sin Lee the interested audience consisted of Korean-
Americans who were living in the United States and members of the general
public that wished to be well-informed about matters of national and
international security such as foreign espionage.76 The Chang-Sin Lee ma-
jority and dissent acknowledged that Americans, especially Korean-Ameri-
cahs, have a legitimate public interest in learning about a North Korean
espionage ring operating in the United States. 77 However, the majority, by
reasoning that the dissent's emphasis on the public's right to know about
foreign government reports would result in the blanket application of the
privilege in future cases, failed to consider adequately the importance to
71. Id. at 805, 2 Q.B. at 569-70. The Webb court noted that a report about a United
States Supreme Court decision on an important question of commercial law has legitimate and
Proper interest for English readers. Id. On the other hand, the Webb court noted that a report
of a judicial proceeding that concerned a scandalous affair between two unmarried people
would not have a legitimate public interest and appeals only to idle curiosity and a desire to
gossip. Id.
72. Id. at 805.
73. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d, 877, 880-86 (4th Cir. 1988) (Kaufman, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority's failure to adopt qualified privilege); infra notes 74-104 and accompanying
text (discussing reasons Chang-Sin Lee court should have recognized qualified privilege).
74. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 882-83. Compare Webb, 2 All E.R. at 804-06 (applying
qualified official report privilege to report of Swiss judicial proceeding) with Chang-Sin Lee,
849 F.2d at 882-84 (Kaufman, J. dissenting) (extending qualified official report privilege to
report of South Korean government press release); see also supra notes 67-72 and accompanying
text (discussing Webb court's rationale for extending qualified privilege to foreign government
proceeding).
75. See Webb v. Times Publishing Co., 2 All E.R. 789, 805 (1960) (stating that foreign
government proceedings sometimes have special connection to English affairs and, therefore,
are of legitimate public interest for English readers); infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text
(acknowledging legitimate public interest in information about espionage in United States).
76. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 884 (stating that report in Chang-Sin Lee had appeal
to Korean-Americans); Brief for Appellee at 23, Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A-Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876
(4th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578) (stressing importance of report for Korean-Americans).
77. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 879 (finding legitimate public interest in information
about espionage ring); id. at 884 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (discussing importance of infor-
mation about foreign espionage).
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the public of information from foreign countries. 7 By contrast the Chang-
Sin Lee dissent, like the Webb court, recognized that, because future cases
would involve subject matter of varying degrees of importance, courts could
employ a case-by-case balancing of interests to decide whether to extend
the official report privilege to a particular foreign government report.79
Consequently, the dissent's case-by-case approach will not lead to a blanket
application of the official report privilege in the foreign government context
if courts properly balance in each case the importance and reliability of
foreign government reports against the interest in protecting individual
reputation. 0
In addition to discounting the public importance of information about
foreign government activities, the majority in Chang-Sin Lee failed to
consider other contexts in which courts have recognized the official report
privilege.8 ' For example, courts have applied the privilege to a newspaper
account based on an official police report alleging that a former sponsor
mistreated two Cuban refugees.8 2 Courts also have extended the privilege to
protect news reports based on records of drunk driving convictions.8 3 One
78. See id. at 879-80 (stating that blanket application of official report privilege in
foreign government context would afford no protection to defamed private persons); supra
note 41 (discussing majority's fear of extending qualified privilege to foreign government
reports).
79. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 882 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (discussing qualified
privilege approach to official report privilege in foreign government context); Webb, 2 All
E.R. at 804-06 (discussing merits of qualified privilege approach),
80. See Webb, 2 All E.R. at 800 (stating that courts should give due regard to interests
of individual when carrying out balancing operation); supra note 70 (discussing Webb court's
concern for individual reputation).
81. See bnfra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing various contexts in which
state courts have applied official report privilege).
82. See Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co., 482 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Ala. 1986) (extending
official report privilege to police incident report). In Wilson the former sponsor of Cuban
refugees sued the defendant newspaper alleging defamation in the newspaper's publication of
statements that the refugees made to police concerning the sponsor's alleged mistreatment of
the refugees. Id. at 1210. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the Jefferson County
Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment for the newspaper. Id. at 1214. The Alabama
Supreme Court held that the official report privilege applied to the news report because the
reporter relied on an official police incident report and accurately reported the refugees'
statements. Id. at 1211-13.
83. See Lani v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 723 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that official report privilege protects state licensing suspension reports). In Lani the
plaintiff brought a libel action against a newspaper publisher for printing a story based on an
erroneous government report that the state suspended the plaintiff's driver's license for drunk
driving. Id. at 459. After plaintiff's trial, the clerk of the court reported to the Missouri
Department of Revenue that the trial court had convicted plaintiff of driving while intoxicated.
Id. at 458. The Missouri Department of Revenue subsequently suspended plaintiff's license
and issued a license suspension report. Id. The defendant newspaper received a copy of the
report and published a story based on the report. Id. The trial court, however, actually had
convicted the plaintiff only of careless driving. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed
the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of the official report privilege. Id.
at 459-60. The Court of Appeals held that, despite the defamatory nature of the report, the
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court has applied the privilege to reports of sanitary code violations that a
city health department issued.8 4 Thus, the contexts in which courts have
applied the official report privilege support the extension of the privilege
to the facts of Chang-Sin Lee." If Americans have a right to be informed
about matters of national and international security, information about
foreign espionage in the United States is equally important to the public as
information concerning health department violations, drunk driving convic-
tions, and statements by Cuban refugees.8 6 Therefore, the Chang-Sin Lee
majority's decision not to extend case-by-case a qualified privilege to official
reports of a foreign government is impractical because courts have applied
the official report privilege to protect news reports concerning American
government activities of varying degrees of importance.
8 7
Although the dissent emphasized that the American people have a right
to know about matters of public interest, the Chang-Sin Lee dissent failed
to address the existence of first amendment considerations in press reports
of official government proceedings.88 For example, the United States Su-
newspaper accurately reported the license suspension report, which was an official public
record. Id.
84. See Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, 34 Ill. 2d 112, 115, 214 NE.2d 746, 747 (1966)
(applying official report privilege to city health department report). In Lulay the plaintiff
brought a libel action against a newspaper for printing a story about violations of the city
sanitary code in the plaintiff's restaurant. Id. at 113-14, 214 N.E.2d at 747. The plaintiff
obtained a jury verdict for $150,000 in compensatory damages and $90,000 in punitive damages.
Id. at 112-13, 214 N.E.2d at 747. On appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the jury's
verdict and held that an official report privilege applies to newspapers that report the activities
of municipal corporations including agencies like the city health department. Id. at 115, 214
N.E.2d at 747.
85. See generally Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1956) (extending privilege to
nonofficial public meeting about local law enforcement); Jackson v. Record Publishing Co.,
175 S.C. 211, 178 S.E. 833 (1935) (extending privilege to political rally); supra note 5, notes
82-84 (citing cases in which courts have applied official report privilege),
86. Cf. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 884 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (stating that infor-
mation about foreign espionage is of great importance); supra notes 75-80 and accompanying
text (discussing importance of foreign government information to the public); supra notes 49-
51 and accompanying text (discussing importance of informational rationale).
87. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (using case-by-case analysis because future
cases extending official report privilege to foreign government context may involve matters of
varying degrees of importance to public). Although foreign government reports arguably are
not as reliable as American government reports and domestic nonofficial sources of information,
the adoption of a case-by-case qualified official report privilege helps ensure that courts will
extend the official report privilege only to reliable foreign government reports of significant
importance to the public, See Chang-Sin-Lee, 849 F.2d at 881 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (stating
that courts are capable of assessing public importance of particular foreign government report).
Furthermore, the dissent in Chang-Sin Lee believed that many American readers discredit news
accounts of foreign government reports if the report originated from an unreliable foreign
government. See id. at 882 (refuting majority's assertion that Americans will assume that
official reports of unreliable foreign governments are trustworthy).
88. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881-82 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
informational rationale for official report privilege); infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text
(discussing constitutional considerations in reporting of official government activities).
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preme Court has acknowledged that speech regarding matters of public
concern lies at the heart of the first amendment. s9 Although the Supreme
Court has never explicitly recognized a constitutional privilege of official
report, the Supreme Court in two cases outside the field of defamation law
recognized the first amendment value of reports of official proceedings. 9
According to the Supreme Court, a major purpose of the first amendment
is to inform the public about governmental affairs and to assist the citizenry
in supervising government activities. 9' Furthermore, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has created a constitutional privilege for
the press to republish defamatory comments of public figures and prominent
organizations while reporting on newsworthy events. 92 The Second Circuit
held that the first amendment unconditionally guarantees the right of the
press to make accurate and disinterested reports on controversies concerning
sensitive issues without assuming responsibility for statements of opinion
that other persons make.93 Thus, courts have provided a constitutional
89. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1974) (stating that
publication of matters of public interest lies at core of first amendment); Dun & Bradstreet
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-63 (1985) (discussing notion that matters of
public interest lie at core of first amendment).
90. See Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-46 (1978) (extending
protection of first amendment to reporting of confidential proceedings of judicial review
commission); Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-97 (1975) (holding that first
amendment precludes cause of action for invasion of privacy for publication of name of
deceased rape victim); supra note 15 (discussing first amendment implications for official
report privilege). Landmark Communications and Cox Broadcasting, however, do not control
the issue before the Chang-Sin Lee court because Cox and Landmark are not defamation
cases. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 143-44 (3d Cir.) (discussing implications of
Cox Broadcasting and Landmark Communications for official report privilege), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 836 (1981). Landmark arose when the state of Virginia attempted to impose criminal
sanctions on those who publish information about a confidential, state judicial review com-
mission. See Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 832 (discussing Virginia statute closing
public from proceedings of judicial review commission). Cox Broadcasting was an invasion of
privacy action, not a libel action like Chang-Sin Lee. See supra note 15 (discussing Cox
Broadcasting).
91. See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 495 (stating that, by reporting the true contents
of government records, news media performs public benefit); Landmark Communications, 435
U.S. at 838 (stating that promoting free discussion of governmental affairs is goal of first
amendment).
92. See Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120-22 (2d Cir.) (granting to
press constitutional privilege to report controversies concerning sensitive public issues), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) ; Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(endorsing Edwards holding); infra note 93 (discussing Edwards case).
93. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120 (stating that first amendment protects reporting of
charges that certain scientists were "paid liars"). In Edwards the Environmental Protection
Agency's 1972 investigation of the insecticide DDT invoked widespread debate over DDT. Id.
at 115-16. In the April 1972 issue of American Birds, a National Audubon Society publication,
an editor claimed that, to prove the harmlessness of DDT, the pesticide industry paid scientists
to prepare distorted analyses of the results of the National Audubon Society's Christmas Bird
Count. Id. at 116. A New York Times reporter subsequently obtained the names of the
scientists from the National Audubon Society editor and reported the allegations and the names
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framework for applying the official report privilege to a case that, like
Chang-Sin Lee, arises from a private figure's libel action for publication of
a defamatory foreign government report.
94
Although the Chang-Sin Lee majority acknowledged that first amend-
ment considerations exist in the reporting of official government activities,
the Fourth Circuit's unwillingness to enlarge the scope of the official report
privilege to include reports of foreign government activities could have a
chilling effect on the news media.95 For example, the dissent noted that
relatively small news publishers, like the defendants in Chang-Sin Lee, may
have problems obtaining access to the facts necessary to establish the truth
or falsity of information contained in foreign government reports. 96 Because
news publishers may find it difficult to verify the truth of foreign news
reports, the dissent found that small news organizations that target a specific
audience may decide for two reasons not to publish reports of foreign
governments. 97 First, without the official report privilege as a defense, a
publisher may not want to face the prospect of a potentially devastating
lawsuit.9 Second, the difficulty of confirming the accuracy of the story
may be too costly for the publisher to undertake or may take so long that
the report no longer will be meaningful to the public. 99 By disregarding the
of the scientists in the New York Times. Id. at 118. Three of the scientists sued the National
Audubon Society and the New York Times for libel. Id. at 119. In dismissing the complaint,
the Second Circuit articulated a press right of neutral reportage. Id. at 120. The privilege of
neutral reportage applies when a prominent organization like the National Audubon Society
makes serious charges against a public figure. Id. The Edwards court held, therefore, that the
first amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of the National Audubon
Society charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding the validity of the charges.
Id.
94. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 143-46 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussing first
amendment implications for official report privilege after Cox Broadcasting, Landmark Com-
munications, and Edwards); id. at 145 n.39 (stating that Pennsylvania courts frequently have
taken account of constitutional principles while fashioning common-law rules of defamation
law).
95. See Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 877, 880 (4th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging
chilling effect of failure to extend official report privilege to foreign government reports); id.
at 884 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (discussing potential chilling effect on press of failure to
extend qualified official report privilege to reports of foreign governments); see also Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 0976) (comparing chilling effect of civil sanction
after publication with freezing effect of prior restraint on speech); Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1974) (discussing chilling effect on press in invasion of privacy action);
Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Iowa 1979) (noting
chilling effect on first amendment rights in false light invasion of privacy action).
96. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 884 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (discussing difficulty
in confirming accuracy of foreign government reports).
97. See id. (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (discussing problems newspapers have verifying
foreign government information).
98. See id. (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (stating that publishers fear potentially costly libel
suits).
99. See id. (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (stating that verifying foreign government infor-
mation takes time). According to the Chang-Sin Lee dissent, the record disclosed that at least
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significance of the chilling effect, the Chang-Sin Lee majority also failed
to address adequately the constitutional concern that matters of public
interest lie at the core of the first amendment.1°°
Finally, although the majority stated that a case-by-case approach for
extending the privilege is difficult, a case-by-case approach is manageable
in the foreign government context because so few official report privilege
cases arise in the foreign government context. 1 1 Chang-Sin Lee, for example,
is the first case in which a United States court has considered whether the
official report privilege should protect reports of foreign government activ-
ities. 102 Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that occasions arise in
defamation law in which courts must make similar case-by-case determina-
tions concerning the importance of information pursuant to the approach
outlined by the Chang-Sin Lee dissent.103 In fact, courts, as the ultimate
arbiters of all disputes concerning competing interests and clashing consti-
tutional values, would be performing one of the judiciary's traditional
functions by determining whether the public interest in a particular foreign
government report outweighs the potential injury to individual reputation,
4
As a result of the Chang-Sin Lee decision not to extend the official
report privilege to reports of foreign governments, the Fourth Circuit may
deprive the American public of access to information of great importance.105
More generally, the Fourth Circuit's failure to extend the privilege to reports
of foreign governments could have a chilling effect on the press.106 Accord-
ingly, the Fourth Circuit should have extended a qualified official report
two of the defendants did not have the resources to confirm the accuracy of the South Korean
government press release. Id. at 884 n.6. The Sae Gae Times, a weekly newspaper, attempted
to verify the story, but the newspaper was unable to contact the plaintiff, Chang-Sin Lee,
before publishing the article. Id.
100. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's concern that public learn about newsworthy events).
101, See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 881 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (discussing case-by-
case approach to official report privilege) supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing
dissent's analysis in applying a case-by-case balancing of interests).
102. See Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 878 (stating that until Chang-Sin Lee American
courts never have addressed whether official report privilege extends to foreign government
reports).
103. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774-78 (1986) (focusing
on facts of particular case to decide the importance of published information); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality)
(deciding whether certain information was of public or private concern). Justice Powell in Dun
& Bradstreet noted that judges must determine by the content, form, and context of a given
statement whether the statement addresses a matter of public concern. Dun & Bradstreel, 472
U.S. at 461 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)); see supra notes 56-65 (discussing
case-by-case approach in deciding whether person is public figure).
104. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing role of court in public figure cases).
105. See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text (discussing public's right to receive
information about important matters of public concern).
106. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing potential chilling effect of
Fourth Circuit's decision in Chang-Sin Lee).
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privilege to foreign government reports by employing a case-by-case bal-
ancing of the interests in protecting an individual's reputation and the
public's right to know about foreign government activities.1°7 By an appro-
priate balancing of the interest in reputation and the public's right to know,
courts best will preserve the freedom of the press and protect the individual
against incidental defamation.108
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107. See supra notes 73-104 and accompanying text (discussing merits of extending case-
by-case qualified official report privilege to foreign government reports).
108. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing balancing of interest in
individual reputation and public's right to know about important matters of public concern).
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